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RECENT BOOKS 
PARENTAL AUTIIORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAw. By Julius Cohen, 
Reginald A. H. Robson, and Alan Bates. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press. 1958. Pp. xii, 301. $6. 
A law professor and two sociologists report herein on a joint attempt 
to assess the degree of congruence between existing legal doctrine, in a 
defined area of application, and a factor which the authors call "the 
moral sense of the community." The justification for the study is pr<r 
vided by the law member of the team, and proceeds from the observation 
that legal scholars, groping for standards of criticism external to the 
law, seem to gravitate toward a "sense of justice," or of "injustice"-
toward a view of morality, at least, which is shared, to some degree, by 
the people in the community wherein the law is applicable. The authors 
vigorously and repeatedly disclaim a position on whether or to what 
extent such a common moral sense should by the law be taken into 
account. They assert, however, that law-makers, both legislative and 
judicial, do in fact frequently refer to it, and the argument is that if 
the moral sense of the community is relevant at all, then it makes sense 
to consider how that datum may be ascertained more scientifically than 
by the divination or intuition of the individual judge or legislator. Their 
study is offered as an example of how this may be done by making use 
of the developed techniques of public opinion research. They do not 
suggest, of course, the canvassing of the community's moral sense in order 
to establish premises for the adjudication of individual cases. It is argued, 
rather, that within a given area of law it would be possible to establish 
community reactions to a selected battery of propositions, and that these 
reactions could then be used as analogical bases for prediction of com-
munity reaction to other situations in a way which, to lawyers, would be 
quite familiar. Their project is an experimental survey of this type in the 
general area of parent-child relations. 
The community selected was the adult population of the state of 
Nebraska. The information was obtained by personal interview, based on 
a standardized questionnaire, of a scientifically selected sample of that 
population. The basis of the study was 860 interviews, one for every 1,000 
of population. The method of selecting the sample, preparing the ques-
tionnaire, training the interviewers, etc., is described in some detail 
for the benefit of anyone interested in pursuing a similar investigation. 
The questionnaire, and extensive tables of statistics compiled from the 
answers recorded, are set forth in full in appendices. The body of the 
book is a very readable account of the results, and of the conclusions 
drawn from them. 
The questions asked of the respondents sought to determine their 
opinions as to what solutions the law ought to achieve in certain described 
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problem situations. An example will serve to convey an idea of their 
nature. "What if an 18 or 19 year old child wants very much to go to 
college~ but the parents are completely set against it, even though the 
child has been awarded a scholarship to pay all his college expenses? In 
this case, if the law allowed the parents to keep the child out of college, 
it could mean that the child would lose out on the benefits which 
a college education can bring. On the other hand, if the law prevented 
the parents from keeping the child out of college, it would reduce 
parental control and increase the amount of outside authority over the 
family to that extent. With this in mind, should the law allow these 
parents to keep the child out of college, or should the law prevent them 
from doing this?" After securing an answer to the principal question the 
interviewer probed for reactions to the same problem under varying 
circumstances, e.g., in this instance, assuming that the parents were 
poor, that the child was a boy, or a girl, etc. He then summarized the 
answers, allowed the respondent to react to the summary, and asked 
him to state his reasons for his position. The responses were tabulated 
to show the extent to which there is agreement in the community as to 
what the law should do, and the extent to which the community views 
correspond with the solutions which would probably be reached under 
actual litigational circumstances. Correlations between positions assumed 
by the respondents and their social and personal background characteris-
tics, such as sex, age, urban versus rural environment, religious affiliation, 
etc., were analyzed, and the reasons cited by the respondents were gen-
eralized to the extent possible. 
It is, perhaps, umesponsive to argue the merits of the questions which 
were propounded to the public, for, as I have said, the authors carefully 
disclaim any position on the extent to which the law should seek to 
effectuate the community moral sense which they were investigating. They 
set out to establish a method, not a matrix for the remaking of the law 
in the area of family relations. They were, nevertheless, unable completely 
to conceal their feeling that their study could be used by "law-makers 
whose juristic philosophy stakes out as an objective a high degree of 
harmony between the existing law and the moral sense of the community" 
as a ready-made set of specifications for law revision in the area of family 
law. Furthermore, as it seems to me, their failure to consider the basic 
question-what bearing should community moral attitudes have with 
reference to the specific problems propounded-has led them into a 
fallacy which is fundamental, and which would be very difficult to avoid 
in any similar project. 
The subject of investigation was the parent-child relation in its aspect 
of parental control versus child autonomy, with some attention given also 
to opinion regarding the proper locus of responsibility, whether with 
family or government, for the support of indigent persons. Their statistics 
reveal that on a total of 17 issues investigated there was a fair degree of 
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correspondence between the law and community views on five, disagree-
ment on ten, and that the results in two instances were ambiguous. This 
amount of disagreement they regard as a serious finding. They suggest 
that it may be explained by the fact that law-makers are likely to be more 
impressed by tradition than is the general public, that this is an area 
in which there is likely to be little practical pressure for change, and that 
law-makers have simply failed to utilize adequate techniques to inform 
themselves of community views. In other words, the variance is explained 
as a lag between the law and a progressive public opinion. The findings 
"point up two crucial problems of political science: the distance be-
tween law-makers and their subjects, and the phenomenon of public 
acquiescence .... [T]he study raises anew the issue of adequacy of existing 
machinery for transmitting community feelings, sentiments and felt con-
victions to law-makers." (p. 21) These are rather portentous conclusions, 
and it seems appropriate to examine the information upon which they 
are based. 
To support the proposition that there is a grave variance between 
the law and the moral sense of the community the authors cite the 
responses received on ten issues. Two of these relate to the minimum 
legal age for marriage, and parental authority to prevent a child's marriage 
by refusing consent. On neither of these issues did the disagreement found 
relate to the principle involved. It related, instead, only to the ages at 
which marriage should be legally possible, and consent unnecessary. The 
views of the community were diverse, and tended, contrary to the trend 
found on other issues, to be more conservative (i.e., in favor of more 
extensive parental control) than the law. A third related to whether a 
natural parent, having voluntarily surrendered custody of his child to 
another, should be permitted to recover it. On this issue 30 percent of 
the respondents sided with the natural parent, 60 percent with the person 
having custody, and 10 percent were in the "don't know" column. The 
authors assumed the law would be on the side of the natural parent. With 
such uncertainty among the voters, however, one can hardly say on this 
basis that there is a shocking discrepancy between community views and 
the law. A fourth issue related to legal liabilities for damage done by a 
minor child, and the finding of disagreement between the law and public 
opinion seems to result, very largely, from what I believe to be a mis-
interpretation of the law. The question put to the respondents was 
whether the child or the parent should be legally liable for damage 
caused by the child in four different situations, unintentionally caused 
property damage and bodily injury, and intentionally caused property 
damage and bodily injury. Nebraska has a statute, enacted in 19!H, im-
posing upon parents joint and several liability for willful and intentional 
destruction of property occasioned by their minor, unemancipated chil-
dren. The respondents favored the view that for intentionally caused harm 
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the child should be liable, and this was taken to be inconsistent with the 
law. The statute, however, does not in terms abolish the child's indis-
putable common law liability, and it would be surprising if it were con-
strued to have that effect. The law, therefore, recognizes liability on the 
part of both parent and child, an alternative which was not put to the 
respondents. In the unintentional injury situations the respondents were 
about evenly divided on the allocation of liability when the child was 
assumed to be 19 or 20 years of age, and favored parental responsibility 
when the child was younger. Again this was put to them as an either/ or 
proposition, and it is probable that the answer was influenced more by 
concern for the injured party than ·by concern for the child. Actually 
the law has managed, in response to this same concern, to recognize 
responsibility on the part of the parent, in addition to the normal liability 
of the child, for unintentional injury caused by the child in some 
situations, e.g., use of the family car. [Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282, 
85 N.vy. (2d) 628 (1957).] This development would tend to minimize 
any lack of correspondence between law and community views under 
this heading. With reference to these four issues, therefore, I cannot feel 
that any very serious disagreement between the law and clear community 
attitudes has been established. 
On all the remaining six issues where disagreement between law 
and morals was found, the law, at the present time, occupies a position 
of laissez faire. The questions relate to parental "authority" (1) to 
determine whether a child may have a college education, (2) to determine 
the child's religious affiliation, (3) to prevent the child from entering a 
career of his own choosing, (4) to transfer custody of a child to another 
person without legal supervision, (5) to disinherit the child, and (6) 
to treat the child's earnings as the parent's own property. In all six 
cases it is assumed that the law bestows upon the parent the "authority" 
indicated, and in all six cases the community view, according to the survey, 
was that the law should "prevent" the parents from exercising such 
authority. It is on these six issues that an unequivocal discrepancy is found 
between the law and the moral standards of the community, and it must 
be principally in connection with these issues that we judge the authors' 
assertions that there is a serious lag between law and public opinion, a 
lag which they suggest is to be attributed to imperfections in the political 
process, and to the "dissenting acquiescence" of a population too inert 
to resist. 
Considering these six issues, it will be noted that the parental "au-
thority" referred to in the first three instances is nothing more than 
the de facto compulsion which the parent, by the very existence of the 
family relation, is enabled to exert. The extent of its legal recognition is 
that the state has not established procedures for supervising it, and the 
probability is that if an issue between parent and child were in some 
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manner raised in court, the court would refuse to interfere unless the 
acts by which the compulsion was exerted were criminal, or so abusive 
as to place in legal jeopardy the parent's custody of the child. In assess-
ing the reasons mentioned by the respondents for their indicated views, 
the authors thought that there was a noteworthy absence of feeling that 
the law should not intrude itself into the parent-child relationship. The 
percentage of those who took the "allow" position and who adverted 
to this point was relatively small, throughout. The authors' interpretation 
of this fact is exemplified by the following comment: "Although where 
the choice of a child's religious affiliation is concerned, there is greater 
expressed sentiment in ·the community against the role of government 
than when the issue relates to the availability of a college education, the 
predominant sentiment, nevertheless, would still recognize the need 
to respect the child's independent choice of religious affiliation, and, if 
required, to employ legal sanctions against the parent to effectuate it." 
(p. 171) A bit farther on the authors indicate that "Those who favored some 
legal control of parental authority ... were not asked just what specific 
type of legal controls should be imposed: this would have been far too 
involved and complicated for our undertaking. It is fairly safe to assume 
that they favored some government-sanctioned means-the exercise of 
authority outside the realm of parental control for the achievement of 
the given ends." (p. 186. Emphasis added, in part.) 
I agree that it would probably have been both impracticable and 
useless to have raised the "how" question with the average member of 
the public. But is it not of the essence? I submit that these answers 
cannot be taken to be, in any practical sense, a true representation of 
community desires, for it is apparent that the respondents had not the 
slightest awareness of the practical implications of their answers. Some 
of the questions incorporated a caveat, "if the law prevented the parents 
from keeping the child out of college, it would reduce parental control and 
increase the amount of outside authority over the family to that extent." 
But how much meaning does this carry to one who is not familiar with 
the workings of the political-legal machinery of the state? If the ques-
tions had been formulated not in the denatured "should the law allow 
or prevent?" form, but in the terms in which they would be faced by 
the legislator or the judge-"Should a statute be enacted establishing 
a Family Liberties Commission with power to conduct investigations into 
invasions by parents of certain enumerated liberties of their children, to 
issue subpoenas and compel testimony, and to issue cease and desist 
orders against parents found to have committed such invasions, and to 
maintain actions in court to compel obedience to such orders, etc."-or-
"Should a child who feels himself aggrieved by the act of his parent re-
fusing to him his right of free religious association be permitted to main-
tain in the courts an action for injunctive relief, etc."-is it likely that the 
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citizenry would have exhibited the same enthusiasm for the Big Brother 
approach that this survey seems to have revealed? 
The other three of the six instances of disagreement between law 
and morals are somewhat different, involving situations (transfer of custody, 
disinheritance, parental ownership of child's earnings) which can, by a 
lawyer, be more easily conceived of as subjects of legal regulation. As the 
descent of property is already regulated by law, there would be no great 
derangement if the applicable law excluded complete disinheritance of a 
child. It might be doubted that the respondents have envisioned all the 
implications, but at least the probabilities are greater here that an imple-
mentation of their views would not produce practical consequences which 
would shock the majority of people affected. Administrative difficulties are 
certainly very substantial with reference to the custody and ownership 
of earnings issues, however. It is easy to pass a law-"Any person who, 
without prior approval of the probate court, gives his child into the cus-
tody of another person (permanently? for a period in excess of ---
days? with the intent to abandon custody himself?) shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor." Enforcement would be another matter, family connections 
being as casual as, regrettably, they sometimes are. And with reference 
to the child's earnings, how should the law attend to their protection? 
It would be possible, I suppose, to require all parents to account as 
fiduciaries, periodically or upon the attainment by their children of 
majority, but I would imagine that compliance would be secured only 
to the accompaniment of a considerable amount of kicking and screaming. 
The subject is fascinating, and the literary qualities of the book are 
high. It will reward any reader, whether he is jurisprudentially oriented 
or simply an interested observer of the society in which he lives. As 
a novel experiment the study adds to the sum total of our experience 
whether the individual reader's conclusions with respect to the relevance 
and validity of the experimenters' methods are positive or negative. To 
me it furnishes strong evidence of the necessity for continuing close 
attention to the factors which make it practicable and desirable to seek 
some social objectives through legal standards and sanctions, while making 
it equally apparent that other objectives must be left to other forms of 
social control. I have no doubt that the moral views indicated by the 
survey are effective in assuring that few parents actually exercise the full 
extent of the "authority" over their children which the law would probably 
tolerate. I am equally certain that to attempt to bring the law into align-
ment with these views would be rank folly. Law does not consist solely of 
norms of conduc_t. The official sanction through which the norm is en-
forced is an inescapable concomitant. A personal conviction as to what, 
in the abstract, ought to be, may serve very well as a moral standard, 
operating through the conscience and will of the individual, but it cannot 
be assumed that the sa;me conviction would survive a marriage to official 
compulsion. 
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Many of the norms which were approved by the respondents in the 
Nebraska survey are such that they could be brought to bear upon the 
community only through legal sanctions which, according to this reader's 
intuition, would be found, by the same persons who approved the norms, 
to be quite intolerable, and by the agents of the law to be incapable of 
administration. I would submit, therefore, that an inquiry into popular 
views of "what the law should be" can be most misleading if it does not 
raise, with the persons interviewed, the legislative question in all its com-
plexity. If that question were raised, I would doubt the ability of the 
great majority of all citizens to respond to it in an informed and intelligent 
way. Query, then, whether the law-maker can expect as much help from 
the opinion surveyer as these authors suggest. 
Luke K. Cooperrider, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
